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THE FUTURE OF STATUTORY CAPS ON NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES IN FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
Allison Mangan*
Abstract
Florida courts rely on the same legislative findings to both uphold
noneconomic damage caps in medical malpractice actions in some
scenarios and strike down the same caps in others. However, Florida’s
position does not mirror the nationwide stance on this issue. After
offering an overview of the national trend regarding the caps—an
analysis of the Florida caps and corresponding cases—this Note will
explain some inconsistencies in Florida case law. It will further discuss
the future of Florida’s medical malpractice caps in the wake of a newly
constructed conservative Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Nationwide Caps on Noneconomic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Actions
Across America, states disagree regarding the constitutionality of
applying caps to noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.1
The debate surrounding capping of damages has “good policy reasons”
and “good arguments on both sides [as to] whether the caps can withstand
constitutional scrutiny.”2 This issue is a relevant and interesting area of
study because persuasive case law exists on both sides of the argument.
For context, medical malpractice cases can result in verdicts awarding
three potential types of damages: economic, noneconomic, and punitive
damages.3 While states vary in the exact definitions of each particular
type of damage,4 the essence of each damage category is similar
throughout the country.5 Economic damages are damages relating to a
patient’s actual economic loss, which can include medical expenses,
future care, and lost earnings.6 Noneconomic damages are for seemingly
intangible losses, for example, amount of pain and suffering associated,
loss of consortium, or a decline in life quality. 7 Punitive damages are
awards, usually high in value, that attempt to punish the conduct of the
defendants involved, as well as to encourage others to avoid acting in the
same manner as the defendant in the case.8
Many states began discussing caps on noneconomic damages as a
result of a national “medical malpractice crisis.”9 Caps on noneconomic
damages, specifically, are discussed as a solution for a variety of reasons.
Those in the medical profession—including medical professionals,
hospital personnel, and other providers of health care—advocate for
damage caps because such caps help to combat the high cost of
administering care to patients, the high insurance premiums for doctors
and hospitals, and “help with risk management due to the certainty of the

1. CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY, CAPS ON COMPENSATORY DAMAGES: A SUMMARY,
https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-summary [https://
perma.cc/D3L9-TL54] (August 22, 2020).
2. Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Wrongful Death Medical Malpractice
Cases – Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 31, 50 (2015).
3. Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damage Caps
Constitutional – An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 515, 516 (2005).
4. Ganske, supra note 2, at 31 n.6 (citing for example Fla. Stat. § 766.202(3) (2014)).
5. See Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at tbl.1.
6. Ganske, supra note 2, at 31.
7. Id.; JUSTIA, Noneconomic Damages, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/
non-economic-damages/ [https://perma.cc/4LTJ-DVP5] (last updated Apr. 2018).
8. Ganske, supra note 2, at 31–32.
9. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 515.
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maximum owed for these damages.”10 Such costs are a concern for many
states that explore and pass caps on noneconomic damages.11 Conversely,
those seeking unlimited noneconomic damages argue that their
nonphysical losses should be compensated, regardless of the difficulty in
quantifying such damages.12
There is no uniformity between states as to whether to cap
noneconomic damages.13 In fact, state caps on damages “have been
upheld under some state constitutions, while at the same time being struck
down in other states with almost identical constitutional provisions.”14
The question of constitutionality in many states turns specifically on
whether the statute or constitutional amendment violates equal
protection.15 In states where equal protection violations are advanced,
plaintiffs argue that the existence of caps on noneconomic damages
separates them into two distinct groups: “those whose injuries are valued
below the cap . . . ” who are allowed to collect their full damages, and
“those with damages in excess of the cap (typically the most severely
injured),” who are barred from recovering a portion of their losses.16
States respond to these arguments with support or opposition through
different mechanisms, including statutory provisions authorizing caps,
constitutional amendments authorizing caps, or the state courts’ striking
down of such provisions.17
The constitutionality of statutory provisions or constitutional
amendments regarding caps on medical malpractice noneconomic
damages can also turn on the argument that such caps violate the
constitutional right to access of courts.18 A typical state provision for
access to courts is that the courts of the state are available to every person,
guaranteeing remedy for injury without undue delays.19 It is important to
note that state courts have interpreted this right of access to courts in
varying manners—so it is necessary to look at state court opinions in each
state to see exactly what its particular right of access to courts means.20
Many state courts rule that “the rights protected by open-courts
provisions [are] relatively narro[w] and hold that they are not
10. Ganske, supra note 2, at 33.
11. W. Kip Viscusi, Medical Malpractice Reform: What Works and What Doesn’t, 96
DENV. L. REV. 775, 777 (2019).
12. Jared R. Love, The “Soft Cap” Approach: An Alternative for Controlling Noneconomic
Damages Awards, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 119, 120 (2012).
13. CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY, supra note 1.
14. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 518.
15. Ganske, supra note 2, at 35 nn.42 & 48–49, 36 n.57.
16. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 522.
17. Ganske, supra note 2, at 33.
18. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 518.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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significantly impinged by damage caps.”21 States that rule in this manner
typically uphold the caps.22 Other states have ruled that the caps on
noneconomic damages violate the state right to open courts because “[the
caps] denied catastrophically injured patients the right to collect their full
damages award without creating any remedy.”23 Both arguments, as will
be discussed below, hold merit.
B. Florida’s Approach to Capping Noneconomic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Actions
In Florida, specifically, statutory authority determines the amount of
noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice action.24 The Florida
Legislature codified Florida Statute Section 766.118 in 2003 to
purportedly combat “a medical malpractice insurance crisis of
unprecedented magnitude.”25 The Florida Statutes define noneconomic
damages as including “nonfinancial losses that would not have occurred
but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, including pain and
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other
nonfinancial losses.”26 Florida Statutes Section 766.118 also includes six
different categories of noneconomic damages that are to be capped in
litigation.27 The categories to be capped include noneconomic damages
relating to: negligence of practitioners and nonpractitioner defendants in
medical malpractice and wrongful death actions; practitioners and
nonpractitioner defendants providing emergency services and care in
medical malpractice actions; and practitioners providing services and
care to a Medicaid recipient.28 Florida Statutes Section 766.207(7)(b) also
caps noneconomic damages at $250,000 per incident if the parties agree
to arbitration of the medical malpractice claim.29 In tandem with this
section, Florida Statutes Section 766.209(4)(a) caps damages for parties
who decline arbitration to $350,000.30 This statute is triggered when the
plaintiff who brings the action rejects the defendant’s offer to engage in
21. Id. at 519.
22. See, e.g., Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc), overruled by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012)
(en banc) (reversing the lower court’s judgment “to the extent that it caps non-economic
damages”).
23. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 519.
24. FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2019).
25. 2003 Fla. Laws 416.
26. FLA. STAT. § 766.202(8) (2019).
27. Id. § 766.118.
28. Id. § 766.118(6).
29. Id. § 766.207(7)(b).
30. Id. § 766.209(4)(a).
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a binding arbitration to determine damages.31 Section II of this Note will
delve further into these statutes and the rationale behind passing each.32
The Florida Supreme Court has invalidated two of the caps listed in
section 766.118.33 In Estate of McCall v. United States,34 the court held
that the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions is a violation of equal protection under the
Florida Constitution.35 Further, in North Broward Hospital District v.
Kalitan,36 the Florida Supreme Court also held that statutory caps on
noneconomic damages for personal injury in medical malpractice actions
violate the equal protection clause of Florida’s Constitution.37 Sections
III and IV of this Note, respectively, will describe these two cases and
explore the reasoning behind the two invalidations.38
In contrast, in University of Miami v. Echarte,39 the Florida Supreme
Court upheld caps for noneconomic damages when parties agree to
arbitrate the claim despite constitutional challenges.40 The Echarte court
found the caps regarding arbitration in Florida Statutes Sections 766.207
and 766.209 constitutional.41 Because of the nature of benefits a plaintiff
receives when a claim goes to arbitration, the Florida Supreme Court
deemed the state constitutional right of access to courts was met.42 Other
constitutional challenges, including equal protection, were not discussed
at length in the majority opinion.43 Section VI will describe the reasons
that the arbitration cap has been deemed constitutional and arguments for
and against this policy.44
The Florida Supreme Court also continues to uphold statutory caps in
other scenarios. For example, section 766.118(4) codifies a statutory cap
of $150,000 per claimant and $300,000 total for all claimants in an action
arising out of the negligence of a practitioner providing emergency
services and care.45 There is no case law overturning these particular

31. Id.
32. See infra Section II.
33. Estate of McCall v. U.S., 134 So. 3d 894, 916 (Fla. 2014); N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v.
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 59 (Fla. 2017).
34. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d 894.
35. Id. at 916.
36. 219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017).
37. Id. at 59.
38. See infra Sections III, IV.
39. Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
40. Id. at 197–98.
41. Id. at 190–91.
42. Id. at 194.
43. Id. at 191.
44. See infra Section VI.
45. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(4) (2019).
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caps.46 Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court upholds caps for
noneconomic damages awarded to Medicaid recipients.47 The ability of
the Florida Supreme Court to support some caps while striking down
others calls for an analysis of each cap to determine what makes the court
take stances on different sides of the Florida Constitution for the
respective caps. With the makeup of Florida’s Supreme Court shifting to
a more conservative bench,48 the upholding of statutory caps on
noneconomic damages is likely. Section VII will delve into the potential
future of statutory caps in Florida.49
II. FLORIDA’S STATUTORY CAPS
A. Florida Statutes Section 766.118
The Florida Legislature passed Florida Statute Section 766.118 as part
of a response to the spike of medical malpractice insurance costs and a
supposed crisis in the medical malpractice liability industry.50 A regarded
crisis is “often the impetus for policy action.”51 In reaction to the impetus
caused by such a crisis, the Legislature passed this statute and claimed
that the high insurance rates in Florida were “forcing physicians to
practice medicine without professional liability insurance, to leave
Florida, [and] to not perform high-risk procedures, or to retire early from
the practice of medicine.”52 After reviewing findings from a task force
put together by the governor, the Legislature found that the creation of
statutory caps on noneconomic damages would potentially reduce the
high cost of medical malpractice insurance.53 Further, the Legislature, in
enacting this statute, reasoned that no possible “alternative measure”
besides the caps would result in a similar combating of the purported
crisis.54

46. Besides Estate of McCall v. United States and North Broward Hospital District v.
Kalitan, the only other case law that Westlaw shows overturning a provision of 766.118, which
follows the holding in North Broward Hospital District, is Port Charlotte HMA, LLC v. Suarez,
210 So. 3d 187, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
47. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(6) (2019).
48. Editorial, The Most Conservative Florida Supreme Court in Decades, SUN SENTINEL
(Jan. 22, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-op-edit-floridasupreme-court-20190122-story.html [https://perma.cc/TMT8-DFYK].
49. See infra Section VII.
50. 2003 Fla. Laws 416.
51. Viscusi, supra note 11, at 777.
52. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 909 (Fla. 2014).
53. Id. at 930 & n.12.
54. Id. at 926 (quoting 2003 Fla. Laws 416: “The Legislature further finds that there is no
alternative measure of accomplishing such result without imposing even greater limits upon the
ability of persons to recover damages for medical malpractice.”).
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The statute lays out the following limitations on noneconomic
damages.55 Subsection 2(a) of section 766.118 caps noneconomic
damages “for personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical
negligence of practitioners, regardless of the number of such practitioner
defendants” to $500,000 per claimant.56 Subsection 2(b) of section
766.118 states, “if the negligence resulted in a permanent vegetative state
or death, the total noneconomic damages recoverable from all
practitioners, regardless of the number of claimants . . . shall not exceed
$1 million.”57 If the injury does not result in permanent vegetative state
or death, the total noneconomic damages are capped at $1 million if there
is a determination of “manifest injustice” or “special circumstances” that
occur, and the “trier of fact determines that the defendant’s negligence
caused a catastrophic injury to the patient.”58 Catastrophic injury is
defined in the statute to include spinal cord injuries, certain amputations,
severe brain or head injuries, severe motor or sensory injuries, severe
neurological injuries, and certain burns.59 The statute “provides no
guidance on how one would determine that death or an injury placing one
in a ‘permanent vegetative state’ could not be considered catastrophic or
particularly severe.”60
The statute continues to further differentiate rewards based on what
person causes the medical negligence.61 If a nonpractitioner defendant
causes a medical injury, the cap for noneconomic damages is $750,000,
instead of $500,000.62 Again, if the injury results in a permanent
vegetative state or death, or a “catastrophic injury” caused by the
nonpractitioner defendant, the damage award is capped at $1,500,000.63
The statute additionally mandates a cap for noneconomic damages for
negligence of practitioners providing emergency services and care at
$150,000 per claimant, and the total noneconomic damages for all
claimants to be a maximum of $300,000.64 Lastly, the statute prescribes
a cap of $300,000 for noneconomic damages per claimant for actions
arising out of medical malpractice “committed in the course of providing
medical services and medical care to a Medicaid recipient.”65 Similar to
the other provisions of this statute, the defendant’s identity in the action
55. FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2019).
56. Id.§ 766.118(2)(a).
57. Id. § 766.118(2)(b).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 766.118(1).
60. William E. Adams Jr., Tort Law: 2001-2003 Survey of Florida Law, 28 NOVA L. REV.
317, 319 (2004).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 766.118.
62. Id. § 766.118(3)(a).
63. Id. § 766.118(3)(b).
64. Id. § 766.118(4)(a)–(b).
65. Id. § 766.118(6).
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is also dispositive the maximum award.66 For a nonpractitioner
defendant, the noneconomic damages cap is at $750,000 per claimant.67
It is key to note, however, the report relied on by the Legislature in
passing these statutory caps did not seem to be as factually sound as the
Legislature took it to be.68 The report, authored by the Academic Task
Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems (Task Force),
detailed the current state of medical malpractice insurance, litigation
costs, and premiums.69 The Task Force reported, “the size and increasing
frequency of the very large [medical malpractice] claims were found to
be a problem.”70 This problem, the Task Force found, was creating an
alleged medical malpractice crisis, causing an exodus of physicians,
drastically high insurance rates, and problems for the Florida medical
community.71 The McCall court, however, found the Task Force’s
findings to be “dubious and questionable at the very best.”72 The McCall
court noted that, according to a 2003 report, the number of physicians in
Florida grew from 1991 to 2001.73 This seems to suggest that some of the
reasons for passing the statute were unfounded, self-conclusive, and not
indicative of evidence that there was in fact a crisis in the Florida medical
malpractice liability industry.74 Additionally, the growing cost of medical
malpractice insurance was not necessarily due to the high noneconomic
damage rewards but included an ebb and flow in the market and a
reduction in the number of available insurers.75 The lack of evidentiary
support in this report76 ultimately led to the court’s decision to render
certain portions of the statute unconstitutional.77 This will be discussed
later in Sections IV and V of this Note.78
B. Florida Statutes Section 766.207
Similarly, Florida Statutes Section 766.207 aimed to fight the high
cost of medical malpractice insurance.79 In addition to the reasons
66. See id. § 766.118.
67. FLA. STAT. § 766.118(5)(a).
68. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 906 (Fla. 2014).
69. See Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 191 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906.
72. Id. at 909.
73. Id. at 906.
74. R. Jason Richards, Capping Non-Economic Medical Malpractice Damages: How the
Florida Supreme Court Should Decide the Issue, 42 STETSON L. REV. 113, 133 (2012).
75. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, 9–10 (2003).
76. Id.
77. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909.
78. See infra Sections IV, V.
79. 2003 Fla. Laws 416.
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mentioned above regarding a purported medical malpractice crisis, the
Legislature added reasons for targeting noneconomic damages
specifically.80 The Legislature stated that targeting “arbitrary”
noneconomic damages would result in cheaper medical malpractice
insurance, as a part of its effort to balance the interest of the harmed
individual with society’s overarching interest in reducing the cost of
medical liability insurance.81 Florida’s reasoning echoes that of other
state legislatures that have discussed targeting noneconomic damages.82
Such reasoning supports capping noneconomic damages, as opposed to
other types of damages, because “[i]t is politically unpopular to suggest
that injured persons should not be fully compensated for their economic
losses.”83 Further, the fact that many juries return very different awards
of noneconomic damages when a similar injury results can raise questions
of “horizontal equity.”84
Florida Statutes Section 766.207 allows for either party to request that
a medical arbitration panel determine the amount of damages in the case
if the plaintiff’s reasonable grounds for medical malpractice are intact
after a pre-suit investigation is complete.85 The statute continues on and
places the cap on noneconomic damages at $250,000 per incident.86 It is
important to note, however, that when a claim under this statute goes to
arbitration, a defendant “who submits to arbitration under this section
shall be jointly and severally liable for all damages assessed pursuant to
this section.”87 This means that the defendant is admitting liability—
something that dramatically reduces a plaintiff’s costs, time, and effort in
litigating and proving its case.88 The statute also provides, in subsection
(7), that the defendant must promptly pay the arbitration award,
attorney’s fees and costs (up to fifteen percent of the award), and the cost
of arbitration.89 Because medical malpractice cases can take years to
litigate, resolve, and ultimately produce payment,90 this provision, too,
provides a substantial benefit to a medical malpractice plaintiff that
agrees to arbitration.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
E.g., 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 608.
Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 516.
Id. at 517.
Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 193 (1993).
FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(b) (2019).
Id. § 766.207(7)(h).
Viscusi, supra note 11, at 789.
Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 193.
Viscusi, supra note 11, at 781.
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C. Florida Statutes Section 766.209
Florida Statutes Section 766.209 governs the effects of a plaintiff’s
failure to accept the defendant’s offer to arbitrate.91 As discussed above,
in Florida Statutes Section 766.207, arbitration offers a claimant in a
medical malpractice action a slew of benefits.92 This corresponding
section details the consequences of not accepting voluntary binding
arbitration.93 First, the statute allows for a jury trial if neither party agrees
or requests to arbitrate the claim.94 If the defendant refuses an offer to
arbitrate, the damages in the jury trial will be awarded pursuant to Florida
Statutes Section 766.118—which as discussed above, would result in no
cap on economic damages.95 If, however, the plaintiff fails to agree to
arbitration requested by the defendant, then caps enter into play.96 Since
the case will obviously then proceed to trial, “[t]he damages awardable at
trial shall be limited to net economic damages, plus noneconomic
damages not to exceed $350,000 per incident.”97 The statute then
specifically discusses the Florida Legislature’s intent with respect to
passing such a cap.98 It sets out a rationale based on the balancing of both
litigants’ interests: “such [a] conditional limit on noneconomic damages
is warranted by the claimant’s refusal to accept arbitration and represents
an appropriate balance between the interests of all patients who ultimately
pay for medical negligence losses and the interests of those patients who
are injured as a result . . . .”99 This statute and its reasoning have been
upheld despite constitutional challenges before the Florida Supreme
Court.100
III. THE MCCALL CASE
In Estate of McCall v. United States, the Florida Supreme Court, in a
plurality decision, declared the statutory cap on wrongful death
noneconomic damages recoverable in an action for medical malpractice
to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Florida
Constitution.101 McCall is the first case from the Florida Supreme Court

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

FLA. STAT. § 766.209 (2019).
Id. § 766.207.
Id. § 766.209.
Id. § 766.209(2).
Id. § 766.209(3).
Id. § 766.209(4)(a).
FLA. STAT. § 766.209(4)(a).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 190 (1993).
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 916 (2014).
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to declare a portion of section 766.118 unconstitutional.102 The court
answered a certified question of state constitutional law: “Does the
statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages, Fla. Stat.
§ 766.118, violate the right to equal protection under article I, section 2
of the Florida Constitution?”103
In McCall, the decedent’s parents and surviving son filed an action
against the United States on behalf of the decedent’s estate, as the medical
negligence occurred at a clinic of the United States Air Force. 104 The
deceased in McCall died as a result of medical negligence relating to the
delivery of her child.105 After the estate prevailed on its claim for
wrongful death, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Florida “concluded that the Petitioners’ noneconomic damages, or
nonfinancial losses, totaled $2 million, including $500,000 for [the
deceased]’s son and $750,000 for each of her parents.” 106 The court,
however, limited those damages pursuant to section 766.118.107 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question above regarding the
constitutionality of caps for the Florida Supreme Court.108
Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, which is Florida’s
equal protection clause, states, “[a]ll natural persons, female and male
alike, are equal before the law.”109 The court conducted an equal
protection analysis to determine whether the statute was constitutional
using the rational basis test, as no suspect class or fundamental right
existed.110 The court applied the rational basis test as follows: “(1)
whether the challenged statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose,
and (2) whether it was reasonable for the Legislature to believe that the
challenged classification would promote that purpose.”111 In carrying out
this test, the court investigated the Legislature’s factual findings.112 To
conduct an investigation “to invalidate an entire enactment is relatively
rare.”113
102. Florida Supreme Court Finds $1 Million Noneconomic Damages Cap Unconstitutional,
9 WESTLAW J. MED. MALPRACTICE 1, 1 (2014) [hereinafter Florida Supreme Court].
103. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897 (all caps in original).
104. Id. at 897, 917.
105. Id. at 898–99 (citing Estate of McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir.
2011)); see also Florida Supreme Court, supra note 102, at 1.
106. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
110. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901.
111. Id. at 905 (quoting Warren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1090, 1095
(Fla. 2005)).
112. Id. at 901; see also James Bush & James Edgar, Florida Medical Malpractice Claims:
Elimination of Noneconomic Damages Caps, 15 HEALTH L. LITIG. 3 (2017).
113. Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 3.
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The first prong of the rational basis test was not satisfied.114 The court
reasoned, “aggregate caps or limitations on noneconomic damages
violate equal protection guarantees under the Florida Constitution when
applied without regard to the number of claimants entitled to
recovery.”115 After the application of a cap to noneconomic damages,
regardless of the number of claimants in this case, the court found that
multiple claimants would be in a worse position than an individual
claimant.116 The “modest amount” saved by this statute in light of the
unfair treatment to multiple claimants caused the court to rule the statute
failed to meet the first prong of the analysis.117 Further, the court found
no relationship to a legitimate state objective.118 The Florida Legislature
relied on reports that that the jury awards of noneconomic damages were
a significant factor in the medical liability insurance rates.119 The court
determined, however, that these findings were “not fully supported by
available data.”120
The second prong also failed, according to the court.121 In passing the
statute, the Senate Judiciary Committee listened to testimony regarding
the “purported health care crisis.”122 Transcripts of debates in the Florida
Senate prove that the Legislature heard that the number of doctors and
medical school applicants had increased, and there was no closing of
emergency rooms due to medical malpractice.123 The Florida Senate also
heard testimony that the caps would not affect the rates of medical
liability insurance.124 The court reasoned that because of this testimony,
as well as other materials made available to the Legislature, there was an
unfounded belief that this statute was necessary.125 Based on this
reasoning, the court found no rational basis and held that the wrongful
death noneconomic damages cap was unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution.126
Conservative Chief Justice Polston, joined by Justice Canady, another
conservative justice, wrote the dissenting opinion in McCall.127 In regards
to the plurality opinion’s analysis of the statute’s equal protection
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 900–01.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 901–02.
Id. at 903.
Florida Supreme Court, supra note 102, at 1.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Florida Supreme Court, supra note 102, at 2.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 916.
Id. at 922; see also SUN SENTINEL, supra note 48.
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violation, Chief Justice Polston focused in on three key areas: the
legislative findings, the rational basis test standard, and the Florida
Supreme Court’s precedent in deciding similar issues.128 First, the dissent
suggested that there were in fact legitimate “legislative findings that
indicated the state was in the midst of a medical-malpractice-insurance
‘crisis’ in 2003 that threatened the quality and availability of health care,”
and that the court should not ignore those findings.129 Polston argued, in
opposition to the plurality’s opinion that the legislative findings were
unfounded, that the Legislature’s efforts in investigating this crisis
included “issu[ing] a report on the issue, h[o]ld[ing] public hearings,
hear[ing] expert testimony, and review[ing] another report prepared by
the Governor’s Task Force that recommended a per incident cap to
remedy the problem.”130 The Legislature also undertook other steps,
besides the caps, to solve this problem: tighter regulation of the industry
and license requirements, which were not found unconstitutional.131
Second, the dissent argued that the rational basis test was clearly
satisfied with regard to the statute.132 Calling the rational basis analysis a
relatively easy standard to meet, Chief Justice Polston’s main argument
was that the judicial branch, in rendering this statute unconstitutional,
overstepped its constitutional boundaries.133 He argued that the judiciary,
under a rational basis analysis, must not decide if the statute at issue
provides the best solution, only that it takes aim at a legitimate goal and
is related rationally to that goal.134 Chief Justice Polston also stated that
the plurality did not take into account the fact that the noneconomic
damage caps were rationally related to the crisis.135 Scholars agree with
this argument, that under rational basis review, “[l]aws subject to this
level of review are almost always upheld, even if the classification is not
the best method for accomplishing the law’s stated goal.”136
The dissent also pointed out inconsistences in the court’s equal
protection analysis in relation to its own precedent. 137 Chief Justice
Polston pointed out that the court in Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hospital Corp.,138 deemed the capping of damages to be rationally related
128. Estate of McCall, at 924, 932.
129. News Service of Florida, Florida Supreme Court Throws Out Malpractice Caps,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 2014, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2014-03-13os-medical-malpractice-damages-20140313-story.html [https://perma.cc/BU3J-EJ5H].
130. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 923 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
131. 2003 Fla. Laws 416.
132. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 927 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 932.
134. Id. at 927.
135. Id. at 930–31.
136. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 522.
137. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 927 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).
138. 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981).
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to attempts to solve the perceived medical malpractice crisis, 139 arguing
that “[t]his Court has employed the rational basis test in its prior decisions
involving equal protection challenges to limitations on damages in
medical malpractice cases,” and such caps have been upheld.140
IV. THE KALITAN CASE
North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan141 expanded the Florida
Supreme Court’s reasoning in McCall, rendering the statute regarding
noneconomic damages in personal injury cases unconstitutional.142 The
court affirmed the Fourth District’s decision to hold statutory caps on
personal injury medical malpractice actions unconstitutional.143 In
Kalitan, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of carpal tunnel
surgery.144 The plaintiff went in for this relatively routine surgery, which
required her to be placed under anesthesia.145 During this surgery, an
anesthesia tube perforated her esophagus.146 The plaintiff eventually
needed additional lifesaving surgery to correct the perforation, was
entered into a drug-induced coma for an extended period of time, and
continued to need therapy and suffered continual pain, mental anxieties,
and mental disorders as a result.147
After hearing the case, the jury awarded the plaintiff $4,718,011 in
total damages, $4,000,000 of which were attributed to noneconomic, pain
and suffering damages.148 As a result of post-trial motions, and pursuant
to the statutory caps on noneconomic damages in section 766.118, the
trial court reduced the jury award while also applying the increased cap
for the finding of a substantially serious or “catastrophic” injury.149 On
appeal, the Fourth District ruled that the trial court erred, and following
McCall, the trial court should have awarded the full amount of
damages.150
The Florida Supreme Court, using an equal protection analysis,
upheld the Fourth District’s decision and rendered the subsections
unconstitutional.151 To begin its analysis, the court looked at whether the
139.
140.
367.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 367.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 927 (Polston, C.J., dissenting); Pinillos, 403 So. 2d at
219 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 51, 59.
Id. at 51; Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 3–4.
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 4.
Id.
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statutory caps were rationally related to the alleged medical malpractice
crisis.152 The court created a hypothetical to illustrate that a less severely
injured claimant, entitled to up to $500,000 in recovery, may end up
recovering more of his or her full compensation than a severely injured
person who will max out at a recovery of $1,500,000.153 The court could
not rationalize why the Legislature would limit recovery between
claimants and category of injury; therefore, the court concluded there was
no rational basis for such recovery.154
The court reasoned through its decision by looking at the
classifications that the statute created regarding “classes of medical
malpractice victims.”155 Subsection (2) of section 766.118 create these
classifications: “Section 766.118(2) provides a cap of $500,000 in
noneconomic damages to a plaintiff who suffers from a practitioner’s
negligence and increases the cap to $1 million in the event of death,
permanent vegetative state, or ‘catastrophic injury’ where a manifest
injustice would occur unless increased damages were awarded.”156
The court noted that the statute defined catastrophic injury to include
“instances that range from amputation of a hand to severe brain or closedhead injury.”157 The court felt that this distinction would create arbitrary
awards for plaintiffs with injuries that differ significantly in true
damage.158 The court found that this portion of the statute discriminated
unequally between claimants.159
The court then considered if there was a legitimate state objective the
Legislature was attempting to achieve.160 Looking to its rationale in
McCall, the court again stated that the reports relied upon by the
Legislature were largely unfounded.161 Further, the court explained that
no evidence supported the continuation of a medical malpractice crisis.162
In fact, the court argued, the evidence actually pointed to a decline in the
perceived emergency situation.163 After the caps on noneconomic
damages failed the rational basis test, the court declared the caps on
noneconomic damages to be unconstitutional and in violation of Florida’s
equal protection clause.164 This decision, together with the Florida
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2019).
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 57.
Id. at 57–58.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 59; see Florida Supreme Court, supra note 102, at 2.
Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 59.
Id.
Id. at 56; Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 4.
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Supreme Court’s decision in McCall, effectively overturned caps for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in the state of
Florida.165
Again, Justice Polston met the plurality and concurring opinions with
opposition in his “impassioned dissent.”166 Two other conservative
justices joined Polston’s dissent.167 The opinion reiterated that the statute
in question “easily passes constitutional muster” under the rational basis
test.168 The dissent, similar to the McCall dissent, spoke about the
Legislature’s efforts to combat an ongoing crisis and why capping
noneconomic damages could potentially offer a solution.169 Arguing that
the judiciary overstepped its boundaries, Justice Polston stated, “it is
immaterial that the majority of this Court disagrees with the Legislature’s
evidence regarding whether there was (or currently is) a medical
malpractice crisis in Florida.”170 The Florida Supreme Court rarely
reweighs legislative findings.171 Instead, Justice Polston argued, the
judiciary should have applied the “proper” rational basis analysis and
found that enacting caps is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest, even if the judiciary could identify a “better” method. 172 By
questioning the Legislature’s findings, the majority inserted itself into a
purely legislative function.173
V. THE ECHARTE CASE
In the case of University of Miami v. Echarte,174 the Florida Supreme
Court upheld two statutory caps, Florida Statutes Sections 766.207(7)(b)
and 766.209(4)(a), that limited noneconomic damages in the context of
arbitration.175 The court reversed the Third District Court of Appeal’s
decision holding these two statutes unconstitutional.176 In this case,
doctors at the University of Miami treated a minor child for a brain tumor,
and issues during the operation resulted in the amputation of the minor
child’s right hand and forearm.177 The minor child and her parents
165. Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 4.
166. Jill F. Bechtold & Alison H. Sausaman, State of Emergency? A Flurry of New Case Law
Creates Uphill Battles for Defending Medical Malpractice Claims in Florida, 36 No. 3 Trial
Advoc. Q. 33, 35 (2017).
167. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 60 (Polston, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 61.
170. Id.
171. Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 4.
172. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 61 (Polston, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 63.
174. 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
175. Id. at 190.
176. Id. at 198.
177. Id.
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brought suit and alleged negligence on the part of the university, and the
university subsequently requested arbitration between the two parties to
determine damages.178 In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
declaratory judgment to render the portions of the Florida Statutes
regarding arbitration caps unconstitutional.179
The trial court held the statutes unconstitutional on various grounds,
and the Third District affirmed the grounds, but only discussed the right
of access to courts.180 Here, the Florida Supreme Court did the same, but
explicitly stated that “the statutes do not violate the right to trial by jury,
equal protection guarantees, substantive or procedural due process rights,
the single subject requirement, the taking clause, or the non-delegation
doctrine.”181 The court discussed the duties and completion of pre-suit
requirements from both claimants and defendants and the applicability of
Florida Statutes Sections 766.207 and 766.209.182 The court then applied
a right of access to courts test in analyzing these statutes.183
Kluger v. White184 is the seminal case in Florida regarding the right of
access to courts.185 In Kluger, the Florida Supreme Court discussed the
right of access to courts and developed a test to determine whether a
statute infringed this right.186 The test is as follows:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a
particular injury has been provided by statutory law…, the
Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without
providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the
people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the
Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of
meeting such public necessity can be shown.187
Thus, according to this test, either the two statutes at issue need to
establish a reasonable alternative to the right that is being taken away, or
the Legislature must prove that there is an overwhelming public need for

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 191; see Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of State Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical
Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R. 5th 245 § 7 (originally published 1995).
181. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 191.
182. Id. at 193.
183. Id. at 194.
184. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
185. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 193 (stating that Kluger is the seminal case on constitutional
challenges to right of access).
186. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
187. Id.
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the right to be abolished, and no other measure is available to combat the
issue.188
First, the court determined whether sections 766.207 and 766.209
gave plaintiffs a corresponding gain in order to recover the noneconomic
damages they seek.189 The court stated that the plaintiff receives “prompt
recovery without the risk and uncertainty of litigation or having to prove
fault in a civil trial.”190 In addition to admission of liability by the
defendants (and fees and costs saved in proving liability), the plaintiffs
also benefited from a relaxed standard of evidence in arbitration
proceedings.191
Second, the court found that even though the first prong of the Kluger
test was satisfied, the second portion of the test would also be met.192 This
prong “requires a legislative finding that an ‘overpowering public
necessity’ exists, and further that ‘no alternative method of meeting such
public necessity can be shown.’”193 Here, the court recognized the
legitimacy of a medical malpractice crisis.194 The Echarte court detailed
factual findings, as discussed above, in the legislative report: an increase
in medical malpractice insurance premiums, an increase in specialty
premiums, and the burden upon current physicians to survive in such a
climate.195 In discussing the second prong, the court deferred to the
Legislature’s findings and the existence of a “crisis,” during which there
is an overwhelming public necessity for these caps to exist.196 The court
explicitly stated that the caps are necessary and can help to abate the
present medical malpractice crisis.197
There are two dissenting opinions in Echarte. Justice Shaw, in his
dissent, argued that the statutes fail the Kluger test, and thus, violate the
constitutional right of access to courts.198 First, Justice Shaw found that
the first prong of the Kluger test was not satisfied, as arbitration did not
offer the plaintiff a remedy that fully redressed the injuries suffered.199
He then discussed the second prong of the Kluger test.200 Agreeing with
Justice Barkett’s analysis, discussed below, Justice Shaw found no
188. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 194.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Crocca, supra note 180.
192. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 195.
193. Id.; see Crocca, supra note 180.
194. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 196.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 197.
197. Id. at 196.
198. Id. at 199 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
199. Tracy Carlin, Medical Malpractice Caps Move From the Legislature to the Courts: Will
They Survive?, 78 FLA. B.J. 10, 12 (2004).
200. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 199 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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overwhelming public necessity or inability to implement an alternative
method.201 In making this argument, Shaw discussed “that even the task
force pointed to other methods of meeting the alleged public necessity,
e.g., vigilant management of medical malpractice.”202
Chief Justice Barkett’s dissent discussed her belief that the caps
violate not only access to courts, but also equal protection.203 Her dissent
vigorously opposed the finding that the Task Force’s report outlines a
public necessity that warrants a limited access to courts.204 Further, she
stated that there is no finding that a reasonable alternative method could
not similarly aid in remedying the crisis.205 In regards to her equal
protection analysis, Justice Barkett offered comments that the Legislature
creates two categories of victims—ones who will be fully compensated
by this statute, and ones who will not.206 She, therefore, would have found
the statutes unconstitutional under both the equal protection and access
to courts clauses of the Florida Constitution.
VI. THE INCONSISTENCES IN CASE LAW REGARDING NONECONOMIC
DAMAGE CAPS
After close analysis of these cases, it is clear that there are
inconsistencies in the Florida Supreme Court’s judicial opinions as to the
constitutionality of caps on noneconomic damages. The three cases
discussed above, McCall, Kalitan, and Echarte, all continue to be
regarded as good law. The reasoning in each of these opinions, however,
is at odds with each other in a few crucial areas.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, inconsistency in the opinions is
the way in which the Governor’s Task Force Report was treated. In both
McCall and Kalitan, this report, relied on by the Legislature in carrying
out its findings, was harshly criticized.207 Language such as,
“dubious,”208 “questionable,”209 and unsound,210 represent how the
majority of the court in these two cases felt about the report.211 In fact,
the court went as far as to conduct its own investigation into the report’s
findings because it garners so much suspicion towards the results.212 In
201. Carlin, supra note 199.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 198 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 906 (Fla. 2014); N. Broward
Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 59 (Fla. 2017).
208. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 906; Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 59.
212. Bush & Edgar, supra note 112, at 3.
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Echarte, however, the court used the report to advance its own
argument.213 The Echarte Court specifically stated, “[t]he Legislature’s
factual and policy findings are supported by the Task Force’s findings in
its report.”214 Now, it is important to remember that in McCall and
Kalitan, the ideological makeup of the court was different from the
makeup of the court in Echarte. That is clear from looking at the dissents
in the three cases. The dissents in McCall and Kalitan, written by a
conservative justice, advocated for a return to the principals detailed in
Echarte.215 It seems that the majority of the court praised the report when
the report’s findings coincided with its position regarding the
noneconomic damage caps. A solution to this inconsistency could be for
future courts to take an active, bipartisan look at the “findings of fact and
history” of Task Force findings and Legislative reports and find a way to
reconcile the differing case law on this issue.216 While the
constitutionality of such economic provisions are obviously dealt with at
a state level, the Florida Supreme Court seems to be applying a test more
stringent than the traditional rational basis test to the argument that such
caps violate equal protection according to the Florida Constitution.
Another blatant inconsistency that has yet to be resolved by Florida
law is the fact that Florida has caps in certain situations and not in
others.217 One way to reconcile this potential problem is to look at the
situations where caps are applied and where they are not. In wrongful
death and medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff does not receive a
benefit if caps are applied.218 In arbitration, it is more readily apparent
that a plaintiff receives some sort of benefit in return for arbitration: a
relaxed evidentiary standard, admission of liability by the defendant, and
fees and costs paid for by the defendant.219 One can at least partially
rationalize a cap in this scenario because the plaintiff incurs substantial
benefits if the case is arbitrated.220
An argument can also be made, however, that despite these benefits,
an arbitration plaintiff may not be fully compensated to the amount that
a full jury trial would have given the plaintiff. It is easy to imagine a
situation in which a plaintiff has a particularly egregious claim, where
both punitive and noneconomic damages would potentially be very high,
where the “commensurate benefits” of arbitration would not begin to
even scrape the surface of a jury trial verdict. This is a clear hole in the
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993).
Id.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 922; Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 60.
Carlin, supra note 199, at 14–15.
See id.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 919–20.
Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 194.
See id.
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body of case law that the Florida Supreme Court has put out in the last
thirty years. Consistency in case law regarding a supposed medical
malpractice crisis, rational basis precedent, and outlook on legislative
findings can remedy some of these variances in the caps on noneconomic
damages.
The Florida Supreme Court’s position to overturn the caps, and the
manner in which it did so (by conducting an equal protection analysis),
deviates from the “normal” outcomes nationwide.221 As previously
discussed, much of the reasoning cited by the court dealt with a distrust
of the legislative findings.222 The national trend of questioning legislative
findings is that “most state courts have been hesitant to overturn damages
caps, even in the face of judicial doubt about their efficacy.”223 Most state
courts are unmotivated to question “the important responsibility that state
legislators have to thoroughly evaluate the evidence supporting damages
caps before adopting legislation.”224 Nationwide, the case law suggests
that if no heightened scrutiny is applied to the damages cap, the cap will
survive such a rational basis analysis.225 This is because the caps may
have a stabilizing effect on insurance premiums that a court must take
into account.226 However, as far as a constitutional challenge in terms of
access to courts, Florida’s Echarte decision echoes most case law across
the country “in states in which courts have interpreted open-courts
provisions to impose substantive restrictions on legislatures’ ability” to
impose caps or other remedies-limiting legislation.227 However, the
overarching approach for access to courts “continues to view open-courts
guarantees as procedural guarantees only, leaving legislatures free to
admit or abolish remedies and causes of action.”228
VII. THE FUTURE OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS IN FLORIDA
It will be interesting to see how the current Florida Supreme Court
deals with the previously discussed inconsistencies in upcoming
decisions. The makeup of the Florida Supreme Court has recently
changed as a result of newly elected Florida Governor Ron DeSantis’s
appointments.229 The new justices are Barbara Lagoa, Robert Luck, and
221. Bryston C. Gallegos, Tort Reform Under Constitutional Fire, 96 DENVER U. L. REV. 17,
17–18 (2018).
222. Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 909.
223. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 516.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 523.
226. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 (2004).
227. Kelly & Mello, supra note 3, at 520.
228. Id.
229. Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, The Most Conservative Florida Supreme Court in
Decades, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/
editorials/fl-op-edit-florida-supreme-court-20190122-story.html [https://perma.cc/TMT8-DFYK].
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Carlos Muñiz.230 The three newly appointed conservative justices are
considered to be younger and likely “could shape the direction of the
court for years to come.”231 Because of these three new additions,
conservative justices, including Chief Justice Canady, Justice Polston,
and Justice Lawson, now dominate the court.232
Because the dissents in both McCall and Kalitan were written by a
conservative justice, joined by other conservative justices, there is reason
to suspect that these decisions may be reversed. Upon appointment,
“[DeSantis has] made it clear . . . that he expects [the new justices] to
reverse a half-century of what he and some conservatives consider
‘activist’ decisions of the Florida Supreme Court.”233 Both McCall and
Kalitan could fall into this category.
It is important to remember that Justice Polston, in his Kalitan dissent,
specifically called out the majority for overstepping the bounds of the
judiciary branch.234 Justice Polston argued, as he did in McCall, “[f]or a
majority of this Court to decide that a [medical malpractice] crisis no
longer exists, if it ever existed, so it can essentially change a statute and
policy it dislikes, improperly interjects the judiciary into a legislative
function.”235 This largely echoes a sentiment that the judicial branch
promoted, while taking an activist stance, its own interests when not
overturning the statutory caps on noneconomic damages.
Further, the more liberal Justice Barkett took the position in her
dissenting opinion in Echarte that the cap violated equal protection.236
This stance has been characterized as “liberal judicial activism.”237 While
this was only a dissenting opinion, the majority opinions in McCall and
Kalitan echoed many of the sentiments that Justice Barkett advocated.238
Therefore, if the issues presented in McCall and Kalitan come up to the
Florida Supreme Court, some of the reasoning used to overturn the caps
230. Id.
231. John Kennedy, DeSantis Appoints Third Florida Supreme Court Justice, Completing
Conservative Makeover, HERALD-TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2019, 10:21 AM), https://www.herald
tribune.com/news/20190122/desantis-appoints-third-florida-supreme-court-justice-completingconservative-makeover [https://perma.cc/VB4K-6GJY].
232. Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 229.
233. Id.
234. See N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d 49, 60 (Fla. 2017) (Polston, J.,
dissenting).
235. Id. at 63; see also Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 922 (Fla. 2014)
(Polston, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent because the plurality disregards the rational basis
standard prescribed by our precedent as well as the Legislature’s policy role under Florida’s
constitution.”).
236. Carlin, supra note 199, at 14.
237. Ed Whelan, This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism–May 13, NAT’L REV. (May 13, 2015,
12:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/day-liberal-judicial-activism-may13-ed-whelan-5/.
238. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 916; Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56.
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may be construed as activism by the judicial branch and used to reverse
the invalidation of the caps.239
However, if the current Florida Supreme Court wants to overturn the
decisions in both McCall and Kalitan, it faces an additional challenge.
Both of these cases suggest that the medical malpractice crisis has
ended.240 In Kalitan, the Florida Supreme Court suggested the crisis had
ended by stating, “in McCall,” the court opined that “there [was] no
evidence of a continuing medical malpractice crisis justifying the
arbitrary application of the statutory cap, [so] we reach the same
conclusion with regard to the unconstitutionality of the caps in the present
case.”241 This statement, now included in precedent, may hinder the court
from attempting to reinstate such caps. If the court wishes to overturn
these decisions and uphold the caps, there will likely need to be evidence
that the medical malpractice crisis is indeed ongoing. This could
potentially require more legislative findings regarding the existence of
such a crisis, and, as previously discussed, legislative findings are often
debated by the makeup of the court. Or, will the court decide to
implement an investigation of its own? If this topic reaches the new
makeup of the Florida Supreme Court, it will be interesting to see how
the existence of a perceived medical malpractice crisis is dealt with.
Additionally, because Echarte has not been overturned by the court, it is
possible that the new conservative majority may use Echarte as precedent
if the issues in McCall or Kalitan were brought before the court.242
VIII. CONCLUSION
The issue of capping noneconomic damage awards is one on which
many states disagree.243 In Florida, specifically, there have been
landmark decisions both allowing and disallowing caps in varying
situations.244 This can likely be attributed to an ever-changing ideological
makeup of the Florida Supreme Court, as well as available findings,
information, and reports.
In 1993, in Echarte, the Florida Supreme Court upheld Florida
Statutes Sections 766.207(7)(b) and 766.209(4)(a), which limit
noneconomic damages when the parties either agree to arbitrate or the
plaintiff denies the defendant’s request to arbitrate.245 The majority found
that the statute, and the commensurate benefits it gave plaintiffs, passed
239. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 916; see also Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 56.
240. Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 57.
241. Id.
242. See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897; Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 58.
243. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 1.
244. See, e.g., Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 916; Kalitan, 219 So. 3d at 59; Univ. of Miami
v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 1993).
245. Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 191.
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constitutional challenge in terms of the right to equal protection and
access to courts.246 It largely relied on the existence of a medical
malpractice crisis.247
In 2014, in McCall, the Florida Supreme Court struck down Florida
Statutes Section 766.188 as unconstitutional and in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution.248 The previous existence
of a medical malpractice crisis was discredited, and the arbitrary way
section 766.118 classified plaintiffs did not pass the rational basis
analysis conducted by the court.249 As a result, in a wrongful death case,
noneconomic damages could not be capped.250
In 2017, the Florida Supreme Court further extended its reasoning in
McCall by holding that in medical malpractice actions the noneconomic
damages cap was unconstitutional.251 Again finding no evidence of a
medical malpractice crisis, the court argued that separating medical
malpractice victims into certain categories of recovery violated equal
protection.252
Echarte has not yet been overturned, and the existence of caps on
noneconomic damages still exists.253 The Florida Supreme Court has yet
to reconcile its treatment of a Task Force report in Echarte with its
treatment of the same report in McCall and Kalitan. The inconsistences
in Florida case law may have impacts in the coming years on medical
malpractice litigation and plaintiffs’ recoveries. The makeup of the
Florida Supreme Court in 2019 has shifted to largely conservative
justices.254 These justices may take the opportunity to build on the
vigorous dissents in McCall and Kalitan to overturn the
unconstitutionality of the wrongful death and medical malpractice action
caps. National rulings also point to a potential overturn of such damage
caps.255 Florida’s highest court has taken a heightened approach to
traditional rational basis, potentially to the point of overstepping into the
Legislature’s duties. Regardless, it would aid Florida’s potential
claimants to have a clear body of case law, or a clear, bipartisan analysis
of this perceived “medical malpractice crisis.”256
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